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Controversies Surrounding the
Hopelessly III Patient
Ned H. Cas$em , S.J., M.D.
Dr. Cassem, who acted as Guest
Editor for this issue of the Linacre Quarterly, is Associate Professor of Psychiatry , Harvard
Medical School , and is a member
of the psychiatry staff at M assachusetts General Hospital . He is
also Faculty Consultant, Center
for Law and Health Sciences.
Boston University and Director of
Residency Training ( Ps ychiatry)
at Massa chusetts General.
I n this article, Dr. Casse m examines the controversies which
have arisen in dealing with a
"te rminal" or " hopelessly ill" patient. Dr. Cassem is a frequent
contributor to medical journals ,
including Critical Care Medicine
and the N ew England Journal of
Medicine.
When does our medical treatment of dying patients become
unjustified abuse? During the last
70 hours of his life in Siskiyou
General Hospital, California, Emil
A. Liloiva accumulated a medical
bill in excess of $10,000. His treatment included two unsuccessful
cardiac operations. After his
death, the County Administrator
rejected the hospital'3 claim for
the portion of the patient's bill
related to those final three days. I
This is perhaps the first of several
lawsuits against hospitals arguing
that certain treatment of irreversibly ill patients was unjustified.
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Elliot Slater2 pointed out that the
two goals of medicine - the relief of suffering and the preservation of health - can become, for
the dying patient, mutually contradictory. The proportion of irreversibly ill persons in whom this
dilemma may exist is suggested
by data from England indicating
that not less than 68 % of the
deaths in that country occurred
after a long illness , predominantly
stroke and cancer. '\ Not less than
half of those individuals were over
75 years of age .
Reflecting the recent surge of
national protest against hospitals
and physicians for unnecessarily
prolonging life in this category of
patient, Abelson I wrote, "Death
of a loved one was bad enough
when it was in the hands of God;
now it is often a much more distressing experience." When using
heroic measures to treat terminally ill patients, physicians are increasingly accused of inhumanity,
experimentation, cruelty, and / or
biological idolatry. U.S. News and
World R eport (May 22, 1972),
Time (July 16, 1973), Atlantic
(February 1974) , New York
Times Magazine (June 23,1974),
and many other popular articles,
along with Patrick Henry and
euthanasia societies from coast to
coast, proclaim that "death with
dignity" is often preferable to life
without it. Celebrities have en-
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dowed this movement for "death
with dignity" with credibility and
considerable imp e t us . Medical
Nobel laureate Sir Macfarlane
Burnet, for e x amp Ie , stated:
"Death in the old should be accepted as something always inevitable and sometimes positively
desirable. Doctors should not
compel old people to die more
than once." To emphasize his endorsement he carried a card with
the message: "I request that, in
view of my age (73), any prolonged unconsciousness, whether
due to accident, heart attack or
strokes, should be allowed to take
its course without benefit of an
intensive-care or resuscitation
ward."
Indeed some blame t he advancement of modern technological devices for treatment now
available in hospitals for creating
an "ethical crisis." On Saturday
evening, January 5, 1974, ABC
television network further publicized the dilemma of persons
with terminal illness by showing
"ABC News Close-up: The Right
To Die." This program highlighted that some persons have felt it
so necessary to protect themselves
from excessive treatment when
they are hopelessly ill that they
are signing living wills. Since
1969 the Euthanasia Education
Council has distributed more than
a quarter million of these documents. Legislation to make them
legally binding has been introduced in Delaware, Oregon, Montana, Mas sac h use t t s , Idaho,
Illinois, West Virginia, and Florida. Currently the U.S. House of
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Representatives is considering bill
HR 2655, which would establish a
Commission on Medical Technology and Dignity of Dying.
In response to similar pressures
the New York Academy of Medicine on December 20, 1972, issued
an official statement, "Measures
Employed to Prolong Life in Terminal Illness." '; The statement
pointed out that traditional religious ethics have always recognized there is no obligation on the
part of a physician to use heroic
measures to prolong life in hopelessly ill patients, and that there
is no prohibition against the use
of narcotics to ease pain even
though such medication may
shorten life. The statement urged
that consideration be given to the
following:
1. Mere preservation of life
must not be the sole objective of treatment.
2. The physician should discuss the situation with the
patient or family and should
encourage both the patient
and the family to express
their feelings and wishes.
3. The opinions and recommendation of the family
physician should be obtained even if he is not a
physician of record in the
particular case.
4. The views of religious advisers may be helpful.
To conclude: When , in the
opinion of the attending physician, measures to prolong life
which have no realistic hope of
effecting significant improvement will cause further pain
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and suffering to the patient and
the family, we support conservative, passive medical care
in place of heroic measures in
the management of a patient
afflicted with a terminal illness. ·;
Catholic Moral Tradition
"Euthanasia" is such an inflammatory word that its use
occasionally makes rational discussion impossible. However, most
of the proponents of "death with
dignity" favor negative (or passive) euthanasia - allowing a
person to die naturally from an
already fatal illness. As early as
1957, Pope Pius XII stated that
there was no moral obligation to
use extraordinary means to prolong life in hopelessly ill patients,
and added that agents such as
narcotic analgesics could be administered to relieve suffering,
even though their use might
shorten the life of the patient."
Traditional moral and medical
teaching has almost universally
regarded positive (or active) euthanasia - direct administration
of a lethal agent, such as potassium chloride - as unethical and
forbidden. The distinction which
differentiates potassium chloride
from morphine given to relieve
pain includes both the intention
of the physician (to relieve pain
rather than to kill) and the effects of the drug. Potassium
chloride, when administered in
lethal dose, has no beneficial effects. Williams, in a survey of
physicians six years ago, found
that 89% stated they were in favor of negative euthanasia and
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80% admitted to having practiced it. Only 15% favored positive euthanasia/ Few physicians
regard the mere existence of
elaborate technological devices as
a moral mandate for their use on
all mortally ill patients.
In fact, St. Christopher's Hospice in London has gained international fame for offering a facility in which terminal patients can
die comfortably without, in some
cases, so much as an intravenous
line if the latter is not warranted. ~
Why then does the public behave
as though the opportunity to die
comfortably will be denied them
by physicians and hospitals?
Fears of Terminal Abuse and
Loss of Dignity
Medical science has in no way
slowed its technological advance.
Bypass grafts, intraaortic balloon
pumps, membrane oxygenators,
advances in transplantation and
other forms of surgery, new drugs
against microbial and malignant
invaders, plus increasingly sensitive monitoring devices for all
who survive the heroic treatments
- all now offer chances of survival that approach the miraculous. Persons who would have
surely died - and before might
never have been treated - are
now given whatever chance they
have in the operating room or
ICU. The condition is worse to
start with and failure is common.
Because the new technologies are
commonly painful and usually
awkward, families of the dead
often que s t ion in retrospect
whether the last ditch effort was
worth it. Were the final heroics
91

only a humiliation inflicted on an
individual whose demise was inevitable anyway? Couldn't he
have died more comfortably, even
with dignity, without them? The
calculus is therefore simple: persons in increasingly desperate
straits are being given better
chances of survival, and the crowd
who linger with this hope at the
brink of death has swollen. It is
a time of tremendous stress both
for the sick and those who take
care of them. Frustrations become
accusations : doctors preserve life
merely for its own sake, experiment for their gains, or commit
murders of convenience; good
money is being squandered on
hopeless cases; healthy younger
persons are excluded from ICU
beds occupied by the unsalvageable; society's resources are being
wasted , etc. But society continues
to demand care and the chance to
live, forgetting that indignity may
well be an inevitable part of the
gamble. More persons are taking
the gamble, and, like soldiers, increasing numbers survive the con flict but have lost the war. They
and their families ask , "Death is
bad enough , why make it worse?"
What is "Death"?
Most persons have no desire to
have their body's life maintained
long after i rr eve r sib I e brain
damage has occurred. Of course,
if a person could be proved dead,
then most would agree artificial
support of organs is not justified.
With increasing de man d for
transplant patient donors , pressure to define when a person is
dead became intense. Because the
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ethical code requires that the donor be dead before organs are to
be removed before transplantation , a major contribution came
with the Harvard criteria of brain
death: absence of receptivity or
responsivity, no s pontaneous
movements or breathing, no reflexes , and an isoelectric EEG , all
repeated at two intervals 24 hours
a part." (This definition of death
is not recognized by civil law in
any state except Kansas, lo Maryland , and in a special way Connecticut I I). Despite criticism of
including EEG data among the
criteria ,12.14 the essence of the
concept remains intact leaving the
conscientious physician with a
set of criteria for judging clinical
death. But a paradox remains.
In Palm Springs General Hospital, Hialeah , Florida , Mrs . Carmen Martinez, 72 , suffering from
lon gstanding hemolytic anemia,
asked her physician , Dr. Rolando
Lopez , to spare her a splenectomy
and all further cutdowns. When
Dr. Lopez sought a court decision
about granting her wish, Judge
David Popper of Miami ruled that
she had a right to refuse the treatment.'i Skillman If, argues that
physicians are forced to make decisions about continuing or stopping heroic measures long before
brain death occurs. Like Mrs.
Martinez, increasing numbers request not to be kept alive until
their brains are dead.
Why the Opposition to
" Death With Dignity"?
Despite widespread general opposition to prolongation of life at
any cost in an illness already irLinacre Quarterly

reversible, the "death with dignity" movement, as well as Living
Wills, have met considerable resistance. Several important factors appear to be involved.
1. The Moral Domino Theory.
Increasing attention has been
given of late to the "slippery
slopes" of science. 1 i According to
this position, the power to decide
for death over life will corrupt its
possessors, lead to direct (active
or "mercy") killing of patients,
and progress to genocide or other
forms of mass extermination. The
first fear received some support
of the level of ethical theory for
while most moral philosophers
and theologians like Ramseyl S
and McCormick l') sharply distinguish the positive (active) from
negative (passive) euthanasia,
Joseph Fletcher21l • 2 1 regards the
two as identical. Most recently
Rachels 22 argues the distinction
has no moral importance in that
active euthanasia is more humane
in many cases t han passive euthanasia. Charles Curran!'! also
regards the two as identical, but
only after the dying process
(which he does not define) has
begun. Therefore, it might seem
that we would he empowering
some persons to do away with
others (see point 4 below). Furthermore, those 0 p p 0 sed to
"opening the door" to legalization
of living wills or passive euthanasia perhaps fear that it will
open a slippery slope destined to
end in practices little different
from those of Nazi Germany a consummation devoutly to be
shunned. 2 4
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2. Difficulty Defining Irreversibility. When is an illness irreversible? Even if we knew the
probabilities of survival which are
appropriate - 5%? 1 %? - a different set of criteria would have
to be developed for every illness
or at least for each type of organ
failure (e.g., heart, liver, kidneys). Imperfect knowledge in
these areas causes many physicians to hesitate beforediscon tinuing treatment efforts.
3. Accomplice To Suicide. Some
have feared that legalization of
living wills may leave those who
comply with their requests open
to the charge of their being accomplices to a suicide.
4. Limitation of Care. DycF i
has argued that the vagueness of
the label "hopeless" tends to justify the limitation of care because
hopeless connotes meaningless.
Because the lives of irreversibly
ill persons might be construed as
meaningless, the care given them
would be limited. For example,
the old could be morally coerced
to forego heroic surgery.
5. Distrust of Human Nature.
Successful execution of living
wills presupposes that those responsible for the life of the signer
act in his best interest. That is,
the signer would not be allowed to
die just because he was cantankerous, because he arrived in the
emergency ward at 2 a.m., because the hospital census was too
full, etc. There are those who believe that this is too much to ask
of human nature, for the same
reason that it is too much to ex93

pect that every nursing home resemble St. Christopher's Hospice.
Reaction of the
American Medical Association
Perhaps the above and other
reasons prompted the cautious response of medical societies in general and the AMA in particular
to the question of "death with
dignity." The interest of the
AMA became clear when its Judicial Council s p 0 n s 0 red the
Fourth Nat ion a I Congress on
Medical Ethics, April 26-28, 1973,
although its scope was considerably broader than the "right to
die." Specific treatment of the
questions of active and passive
euthanasia came when, at its December 1973 convention in Anaheim, California, the AMA conde m ned "mercy killing." Although opposing efforts to obtain
a legal definition of the moment
of death, they adopted the following resolution on "death with
dignity":
The cessation of the employment of
extraordinary means of prolonging
the life of the body when there is
irrefutable evidence that biological
death is imminent is the decision of
the patient and /or his imm ediate
family.

Furthermore, although there
has been great reluctance, for
medico-legal reasons, to record
orders like "DNR" (do not resuscitate) or "CMO" (comfort
measures only) in the chart or
order book, the American Medical
Association has very recently
recommended such a practice. In
a recent supplement to their
J oumal entitled "Standards for
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
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(CPR) and Emergency Cardiac
Care (ECC) ," the following statement was made:
The purpose of cardiopulmonary
resuscitation is the prevention of
sudden, unexpected death. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is not indicated in certain situations, such
as ' in cases of terminal irreversible
illness where death is not unexpected or whe re prolonged cardiac
arrest dictates the futility of resuscitation efforts. Resuscitation in
these circumstan ces may r epresent
a positive violation of an individual's right to di e with dignity.
When CPR is considered to be contraindicated for hospital patients, it
is appropriate to indicate this in the
patient's progress notes. It also is
appropriate to indicate this on the
physician's order sheet for the benefit of nurses and other personnel
who may be called upon to initiate
or participate in cardiopulmonary
resuscitation.2 6

How Does One Decide to
Forego Heroic Measures?
Even though there may be
unanimous agreement that there's
a time to stop trying to prolong
life and evidence that 80% of
physicians have at some time
done SO, 26 there are no unanimous
guidelines for discharging this
awe s 0 m e responsibility. Two
oversimplified and premature, if
convenient, methods are the economic solution and the effort to
define quality of life by defining
who qualifies for personhood.
The economic solution is now
employed in certain provinces of
Canada, where each hospital is
given a budget and told simply to
decide how they wish the money
to be spent. The utilization of
facilities for the hopelessly ill
Linacre Quarterly

must then be weighted against
their use for "more salvageable"
persons. Of course the hope is
that the hospital will then be
forced to find the most responsible and humane solution to their
life-and-death dilemmas. However, each decision to stop the
fight against a lethal illness has
moral, technological (or medical) ,
legal, and psychosocial considerations as well as economic ones.
To assert that the economic factors should be the sole or primary
determinants of policy is surely a
distortion of priorities as well as
an oversimplification of a complex
and grave issue. Furthermore, selection of a sole economic criterion by a wealthy nation like
the United States which spends
billions on methods of destroying
health and lives, is open to serious
question.
The "quality of life" solution
seeks to help by defining the
marks of human personhood so
that "mere biological life" need
not be prolonged. Joseph Fletcher
is probably the best known proponent of this effort and includes
among defining marks of "humanhood": minimal intelligence
(LQ. greater than 40), ability to
communicate with others, control
of existence, self-awareness, selfcontrol, curiosity, a sense of past,
present and future, creativity /
changeability, distinctiveness, a
balance of rationality and feeling,
and neocortical functioning.27 In
addition to the specters awaiting
us at the foot of the "slippery
slope" descending from this formulation, it shares all the follies
May, 1975

of pure abstractions. Even though
infants, our patients, our spouses,
our colleagues or ourselves might
not qualify as persons under these
criteria, the decision to let an individual die is not necessarily
clarified by their application. We
would do well to heed Ingelfinger's warning: " As there are few
atheists in fox holes, there tend
to be few absolutists at the bedside." 28
Must we then say nothing ethically? McCormick 29 reminds us
that failure to seek guidelines for
these decisions leaves only the
alternatives either of dogmatism
or of pure concret ism. There must
be some line that can be drawn
between vitalism (life at any
cost) and pessimism (death when
life becomes frustrating, burdensome, useless). Both extremes are
based on an idolatry of life. McCormick used life as a relative
good and the duty to preserve it
a limited one. McCormick formulates life as a value to be preserved only where it contains
some essential for human relationships. When, because of the
condition of the individual, this
potential would be completely
subordinated to the mere effort
for survival, then the life can be
said to have achieved its potential.
Are there any practical guidelines to help determine when the
time has come to halt efforts to
prolong life? Collins 30 has employed a Dying Score derived
from evaluation of five physiological parameters (cerebral function ,
reflexes, respiration, circulation,
95

cardiac action) to study irreversibility of illness in patients following resuscitation.
Two extremely important contributions toward the further
study and understanding of the
components of life-and-death decisions in critical care settings
were recently presented in Critical Care Medicine. Cullen et a131
presented a method for quantifying the energy expenditure in caring for ICU patients, both in
terms of procedures performed
and in number of personnel devoted to the effort. The Therapeutic Intervention Scoring System (TISS) provides a powerful
tool for quantifying the intensity
of effort invested in a critically
ill person. The authors do not
suggest even that it be used in
deciding which patients should or
should not be vigorously treated.
What they provide is an invaluable measure for relating intervention, cost, and use of personnel.
to efforts at reversing specific potentially lethal conditions. The
TISS may help us answer the
crucial question of what we can
or cannot accomplish by medical
technology in the effort to restore
health.
Tagge et a132 presented what
appears to be the most promising
method yet for deciding responsibly when specific interventions
are no longer reasonable. This
Mount Sinai classification of patient care categories avoids entirely the pit fall s of apriori
criteria which must be met in order for a decision to be made to
decrease the intensity of care
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given to a critically-ill person. Its
genius lies in its establishment of
a process, openly acknowledged
and regularly exercised, by which
the entire treatment (lCU) team
is forced to confront the question
of what is best for the whole person in question. As such, the real
question initially introduced is our intervention, in fact, abuse
disguised as treatment-is forced
from the shadows of taboo and
secrecy and confronted in a way
that guarantees (even forces)
open, maximal communication. It
seems clear from the experience
at our own hospital that almost
all the disputes over whether a
terminally-ill patient should be
treated more or less intensively
have arisen because communication was faulty. One, of course,
could argue that the team as a
whole could be corrupted by possession of such arbitrary power.
However, when the family and
the patient (whenever conscious)
are partners to the decision, the
threat of the "slippery slope" IS
far less likely.
The Hardest Work
Talk of a degnified death may
be, in fact, a form of self delusion.
Suffering, p a i n f u 1 separation,
grief and anguish are seldom entirely absent from any death regardless of our efforts to wish it
away by slogans. 33,34 There may
be an illusion in the minds of
some that once the decision is
made and no further heroics will
be used, all difficulties are solved.
That point is precisely where they
are most likely to begin and where
most care and attention need be
Linacre Quarterly

given to both patient and family.
The responsibility for making decisions to continue or omit extreme measures is awesome
enough. After they have been
made, the delicate and sensitive
issues of human suffering and loss
demand even more compassion
and courage to continue care under those circumstances. Y oUhg
physicians and nurses need more
guidance in discharging these responsibilities. W hat our colleagues have confronted alone in
past centuries we must now face
together.
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